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Building brand Kurdistan: Helly
Luv, the gender of nationhood, and
the War on Terror Nicholas S. Glastonbury 
Abstract
In the early 2000s, the Kurdistan Regional Government hired a US-based firm to begin a public
relations campaign called “The Other Iraq.” Since that time, it has worked with a number of PR
and lobbying firms to build a cultural, political, and financial apparatus that I refer to as Brand
Kurdistan. This apparatus aims to prove to Western audiencesthat the Kurds are a liberal
exception in an illiberal Middle East, and to build prospects of KRG’s eventual national
independence. This article explores the connections between Brand Kurdistan and the gendering
of Kurdish nationalism, focusing particularly on Kurdish pop diva Helly Luv. In her music, Luv
underscores the trope of the “badass” Kurdish woman in the service of Brand Kurdistan’s
political and economic projects. Thus, Brand Kurdistan and Helly Luv mutually reproducethe
binary world discourse of the war on terror, a discourse aligned with neoconservative American
war making and exertions of US empire.
Keywords: Gender; nation branding; pop music; war on terror; Iraqi Kurdistan.
ABSTRACT IN KURMANJI

Çêkirina Marka Kurdistanê: Helly Luv, cinsiyeta netewetiyê, û Şerê li Dijî
Terorê
Serê salên 2000an, Hikûmeta Herêmî ya Kurdistanê (HHK) şirketeke emerîkî girt da ku
helmeteke danenasîna giştî bi navê “Iraqa Din” bi rê ve bibe. Ji hingê ve, hikûmetê ligel çendîn
şirketên têkiliyên cemawerî û lobiyê kar kiriye ku mêkanîzmeke çandî, siyasî û darayî ava bike, ya
ku ez wek "Marka Kurdistanê" bi nav dikim. Ev mêkanîzm armanc dike ku li cemawerên Rojavayî
biçespîne ku Kurd istisnayeke lîberal in di Rojhilata Navîn a dûr ji lîberaliyê de, û wisa jî derfet û
şansên serbixweyiya neteweyî ya HHKyê bilindtir bike. Ev meqale li têkiliyên di navbera Marka
Kurdistanê û bi cinsiyetkirina netewegeriya kurdî dikole, û ji bo vê yekê li ser Helly Luva stranbêja
kurd hûr dibe. Luv di muzîka xwe de balê dikêşe ser têmaya jinên Kurdistanê yên “neguhdar/asî”
di xizmeta projeyên siyasî û aborî yên Marka Kurdistanê de. Wisa jî, Marka Kurdistanê û Helly
Luv bi awayekî muteqabil dîskûra duserî ya şerê li dijî terorê vesaz dikin, dîskûrek ku hevterîb e
ligel şerkeriya muhafizekariya nû ya emerîkî û hewlên împeretoriya Dewletên Yekbûyî yên
Emerîkayê.
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ABSTRACT IN SORANI

Dirûstkirdinî Brand Kurdistan: Helly Luv, cênderî neteweyatî w Şerrî Dij Be
Têror
Le seretay salanî 2000, Hikûmetî Herêmî Kurdistan şerîkeyekî emrîkîy girt bo berêwebirdinî
hellmetêkî pêwendiye cemaweriyekan be nawî "Êraqî Dîke". Lew katewe, hikûmet legell çendîn
şerîkeyî pêwendiye cemaweriyekan û lobî karî kirdûwe bo dirûstkirdinî amrazêkî kultûrî, siyasî û
darayî, ke min nawî denêm "Brand Kurdistan". Em amraze amanciyetî le cemawerekanî rojavayî
biçespênê ke kurd nimûneyekî yektay komelgay lîbiral in le Rojhellatî Nawerastî dûr le lîbiralî, û
bem şêweye beqay Hikûmetî Herêmî Kurdistan bo bedesthênanî serbexoyîy neteweyî ziyatir
bikat. Em wutare sebaret pêwendiyekanî nêwan Brand Kurdistan û becênderkirdinî netewegerrîy
kurdî ye, be taybetîş çaw le Helly Luvî dîvay popî kurd dekat. Le mosîqayekey da Luv têmay jinî
kurdî "yaxî" le xizmet projekanî siyasî û aborîy Brand Kurdistan da dexate pêş. Bem şêweye,
Brand Kurdistan û Helly Luv pêkewe ew dîskûrî cîhanî duberekîy le ser şerrî dij be terror serlenwê
dirûst deken, dîskûrêk ke hawterîbe legell şerrkerîy muhafizekarekanî nwêy emrîka û hewllekanî
împeretorîy Dewlete Yekgirtûyekanî Emrîka.

Introduction
The music video for Helly Luv’s 2015 pop anthem “Revolution” begins,
innocuously enough, in “a village somewhere in Kurdistan”. Children laugh and
play as they make their way to school; men sit around tables chatting, drinking
tea and playing backgammon; women buy vegetables at roadside stands.
Suddenly, though, the ground begins to rumble, and a bomb explodes in a
building nearby, plunging the village into chaos. Amid the smoke and scorched
earth, as bodies fly and children weep, tanks ride into town, mounted by Islamic
State military forces, firing into the fleeing crowds. The video shifts to a shot
along the ground, and we see the feet of those fleeing the Islamic State. But
walking in the opposite direction, towards the tanks, a pair of golden high heels
appears in the frame, accompanied by the rising sound of a chamber choir: it is
Helly Luv, her ankles adorned with gold bangles. In the next shot, we are behind
her mysterious figure, dressed in a black jumpsuit, her head covered by a red
and white keffiyeh, a scarf that indexes political resistance, walking towards the
tanks. People in the crowd stop to look at her in awe and admiration. Finally,
in the next frame, we see her face, mostly covered by the red keffiyeh, save her
eyes, forehead, and some of her “Rihanna-red” hair (Al-Nasrawi, 2015); a
golden chain runs across her forehead; two black keffiyehs are tied around her
chest like a pair of cartridge belts. Her hands, covered in an elaborate henna
pattern, are spangled with golden rings and bracelets made of gold bullets.
Striding confidently up to the tank’s turret, she lifts up a banner that reads, in
English, “STOP THE VIOLENCE.” She tosses it aside and pulls off the red
keffiyeh as the screen goes black and the beat drops. Garbed in guerrilla couture,
Helly Luv spends the rest of this seven-minute-long video leading the people
of this village in a musical insurrection against ISIS, under the banner of
Kurdish emancipation and revolution.
In this article, I want to explore the media world inhabited by Helly Luv,
both within Iraqi Kurdistan and transnationally. I am interested not only in
www.KurdishStudies.net

Glastonbury 113

tracing the discourse of social and political liberation embedded in this music,
but also in understanding Helly Luv, along with the trope of the “badass”
Kurdish women fighting for Kurdish liberation, against the political and
cultural landscape of gender and womanhood in Iraqi Kurdistan. What are the
gendered discourses that underpin the idea of the Kurdish nation, and how do
these discourses circulate globally? What kinds of work does pop music do in
the service of these global circuits of representation? What political and cultural
projects are Kurdish pop divas like Helly Luv involved in, and how do such
projects come to bear upon larger notions of nationhood, nationalism, and
futurity in Iraqi Kurdistan?
I begin this article by exploring the connections between gender,
womanhood, and nationalism in Iraqi Kurdistan. Scholars across the Middle
East (and around the world) have critically analysed the gendered construction
of nationalism, the normative concepts of gender and sexuality implicit in the
nation, and the ways in which the nation is represented through and as woman
(Delaney, 1995; Danielson, 1997; Najmabadi, 1997, 2005; Göçek, 2002; Baron,
2005; Çağlayan, 2007; Ahmadzadeh, 2008). This literature highlights not only
the ways in which modern nation-states and nationalism are produced in
gendered ways, but also the ways in which women’s political cultures become
transformed through the growing hegemony of nationalism as a political idiom.
Attending to these questions in the case of Iraqi Kurdistan is particularly
instructive because, unlike many of the case studies in the aforementioned
literature, which take place mostly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, it represents a fecund site to consider how gender and nationalism
intersect in the present world-historical moment animated by financialised
capitalism and the global war on terror (King, 2008, 2013; Hague, Gill, and
Begikhani, 2012; Hardi, 2013; Alinia, 2013; Buffon and Allison, 2016; Toivanen
and Başer, 2016).
From here I move into my discussion of “nation branding” and the
emergence of what I call Brand Kurdistan. As Melissa Aronczyk (2013) writes
in her study of the phenomenon, nation branding “is seen as a way to help a
nation articulate a more coherent and cohesive national identity, to animate the
spirit of its citizens in the service of national priorities, and to maintain loyalty
to the territory within its borders” (p. 3). At the same time, it represents a means
of reifying national culture as a singular, monetisable, marketable commodity.
As such, nation branding serves the crucial purposes of globalising the nation
as a discrete entity while also vesting national populations with a fixed repertoire
of Kurdish culture and heritage. While nation branding is predominantly
pursued by nation-states, I argue that Iraqi Kurdistan has engaged in nationbranding because it is the emergent idiom of nationhood under contemporary
capitalism. By communicating in this idiom, in other words, the Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG) is able to transnationally present Iraqi Kurdistan
as if it is a nation-state. The repertoire of images, discourses, and representations
that emerge out of KRG’s branding efforts, which include those produced and
Copyright @ 2018 KURDISH STUDIES © Transnational Press London
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circulated by lobbyists and public relations firms, are what I refer to hereafter
as Brand Kurdistan. Brand Kurdistan is predicated upon the commodification
not only of ethnicity and nationality, but also of civilisation itself. To buy into
this version of Kurdishness is to reject the barbarism of the Islamic State and
all that it stands for; to refuse is to capitulate not only to religious extremism
but to the status quo. To refuse, in other words, is to let the terrorists win.
It is against this backdrop that I shift my focus to the musical stylings of
Kurdish pop diva Helly Luv, attending to the ways in which she appears as an
ideal-object, not only for the cathexis of the “western fascination with badass
Kurdish women” (Dirik, 2014), but also for Brand Kurdistan as a whole.1 I look
not only to her music and her videos but also to her reception, particularly
amongst Euro-American audiences. These pop songs tap into globalised
discourses of liberal feminism, cosmopolitanism, and anti-terrorism that
consequently redound upon the image of Iraqi Kurdistan as a potential nationstate. Rather than reflecting a revolutionary project of fundamentally
reimagining social, political, and economic relations, (the task, after all, of
revolution), Helly Luv’s “Revolution”, and the other songs I discuss in this
article, exemplify the widespread tendency to represent the nation-state as the
sole object of struggle and inevitable telos of political imagination for ethnic
minorities.
I conclude by analysing the connections between Brand Kurdistan and Helly
Luv, using these connections to trace not only the reasons for the failure of the
September 2017 independence referendum but also the kinds of futures that
this failure indexes. If, after all, Brand Kurdistan operates in the ways I describe,
why would it fail to deliver? The answer has to do not only with the heightening
contradictions among liberal democracy, nation-states, and global capitalism,
but also the ways in which Kurdistan confounds some of the constitutive
elements of the nation-state form. The failure of the independence referendum
thus compels a critical re-evaluation of the political, cultural, and economic
priorities that guide struggles for emancipation across Kurdistan.
Gendering Kurdish nationalism in Iraq
Scholars of nationalisms in the Middle East have written about how the
nation is frequently represented and imagined upon and through women’s
bodies as a means of consecrating its place within the daily lives of those who
inhabit it (Delaney, 1995; Najmabadi, 1997; Danielson, 1997; Göçek, 2002;
Baron, 2005). The nationalisation of the idea of homeland meant its discursive
1 While I found several sources that claimed the KRG was investing in Helly Luv’s music, I was unable
to find any primary documents that corroborated these sources. Consequently, in the lack of meaningful
evidence, I do not mean to argue here that she is an official part of the KRG’s sanctioned nation branding
campaign, nor that she is being backed financially, produced, or managed by officials within the KRG. Rather,
I argue that the emergence of Brand Kurdistan over the past fifteen years has quite effectively set the terms
through which Iraqi Kurdishness is articulated to global audiences. It has enacted a kind of hegemony over
the field of cultural production in Iraqi Kurdistan such that producing music for an international (read:
Western) audience would be unfathomable except within the repertoires of Brand Kurdistan.
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transformation into both “mother” and “beloved”: that is, homeland not only
as a body that bears the individual and his identity into being, but also “a body
to love and be devoted to, to possess and protect, to kill and die for”, to protect
from the penetration of outside forces (Najmabadi, 1997: 445). Women and
their bodies become metonyms for the nation, standing in for anxieties about
the nation’s honour and purity while also being resignified according to
archetypes of kinship and family (Baron, 2005: 40-42). As a consequence,
women’s bodily practices and dispositions are not simply expressions of
individual morality or propriety but also crucial indices of national honour and
pride: regulating and disciplining women’s bodies and sexual lives as a means
of articulating sovereignty (Delaney, 1995; King, 2008). Women’s honour is
thus a manufactured discourse operating simultaneously across multiple scales:
the individual body, the family unit, the community, and the nation.2
In Iraqi Kurdistan, the connections between gender, womanhood, and
nation should be understood in historical context. State leaders tend to be
described in everyday speech using the language of kinship, with Mustafa
Barzani as the “father” of Iraqi Kurdistan, Masoud Barzani as kak, or
“brother,” and Jalal Talabani as mam, or “uncle” (King, 2008: 333). Nationalist
Kurdish novels written by men from the mid-twentieth century onwards tend
to represent Kurdistan through the figure of “a suffering, sick and dying
woman, often a mother”, who needs “the nation’s boys” to protect her (Alinia,
2013: 35; Ahmadzadeh, 2003, 2008). While these discourses about women as
nation have changed since that time, as I describe below, it is worth noting that
Iraqi Kurdish nationalism has been and remains profoundly conservative, even
with the emergence of a robust women’s movement and the recent media
spectacle surrounding Kurdish women taking up arms (Dirik, 2014; Toivanen
and Başer, 2016). Iraqi Kurdish nationalism has by and large failed to
incorporate an intersectional approach to gender, class, religion, and other
categories of identity over the course of its history, effectively reining in the
capacity of women’s full participation in political life (Alinia, 2013; Hardi, 2013;
Ahmad, 2018).
Given the unevenness of European colonial domination in the Middle East,
Kurdish nationalism in Iraq took different trajectories than in Turkey, Iran, and
Syria, and should be understood as distinct from these other three contexts
2 It is precisely this multi-scalar quality of honour that underpins the scholarship on “honour killings”, a
topic that is hypervisible in the literature on gender and sexuality in the Middle East and especially in
Kurdistan. In her writings about honour crimes in Turkey, Dicle Koğacıoğlu (2004) has written compellingly
about the institutional, legal, and theoretical discourses surrounding honour crimes, arguing that such
discourses all too often end up reifying the concepts of tradition and honour. She shows how these
reifications naturalise the concept of tradition, thereby placing it outside the scope of politics and foreclosing
the possibility of political critique of the structures and institutions through which women’s “honour” is
reproduced. Following Koğacıoğlu, I try to push against the naturalisation of concepts of honour and
tradition as they relate to women’s place within the nation, even when these concepts enter into the
scholarship on Iraqi Kurdistan. My intention is not to minimise or dismiss the urgency of challenging and
combating entrenched patterns of violence against women. Rather, I am trying to argue against the culturalist
accounts of honour killings prevalent in popular and scholarly accounts of honour killings. For more on this,
see Abu-Lughod (2002), Koğacıoğlu (2004), and Buffon & Allison (2016).
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(Alinia, 2013: 17). As a modern political unit, the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR)3
has existed since the era of the British mandate of Iraq, when the sheikhs of the
Kurdish Barzan tribe began agitating for greater political recognition. In 1946,
Mulla Mustafa Barzani, often referred to as the “father” of Iraqi Kurdistan,
founded the Kurdistan Democratic Party (Partiya Demokrat a Kurdistanê, KDP),
in concert with the establishment of the Mahabad Republic (in present-day
Iran), a short-lived independent Kurdish state supported by the Soviet Union.
After some time in exile in the Soviet Union, Mulla Mustafa Barzani returned
to Iraqi Kurdistan where, after his death, his sons remained at the helm of the
KDP.
In 1992, following Saddam Hussein’s Anfal campaign as well as the first
Gulf War, the Kurdistan Regional Government was founded, vesting limited
autonomy to the Iraqi Kurdistan region and its political actors. According to
Choman Hardi (2013: 46), only in the wake of the Gulf War does it become
possible to speak of a concerted women’s movement in Iraqi Kurdistan. Yet
during this time, women’s activism was very circumscribed with political parties
serving as gatekeepers to crucial resources; indeed, virtually every party in Iraqi
Kurdistan supported a subsidiary women’s organisation (Hardi, 2013: 49).
Women’s activism in the late 1990s and early 2000s produced legislative gains
for women and facilitated women’s increased visibility in public life; crucially,
these transformations aligned with “the KRG’s attempt to create a democratic
self-image” (Hardi, 2013: 51). While I will return to this point in my discussion
of nation branding, I want to emphasise how the image of Kurdish women
(albeit resignified) continued to serve as a crucial site for the KRG to project
an image of itself, this time as a progressive, modern, liberal political entity.
The US invasion of Iraq, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s government
and the enduring war on terror have only led to a retrenchment of this image.
Indeed, for the past five years or so, as the Kurdish struggles against ISIS have
gained media attention, the figure of the woman guerrilla fighter has become
synonymous in western discourse with the Kurdish freedom movement. While
there may be Kurdish women fighting within the ranks of the Peshmerga in
Iraq, no efforts have been made to establish structures for gender parity and
women’s leadership akin to the structures in Rojava and Bakur. Yet the hyperrepresentation of Rojava’s women guerrillas in Euro-American news media has
led to a “western fascination with badass Kurdish women” who defy Orientalist
and neo-Orientalist presumptions that women in the Middle East are “always
already” oppressed by their cultures (Dirik, 2014). As the battles against the
Islamic State have raged in Rojava as well as in Iraqi Kurdistan, images of
Kurdish women dressed in military fatigues and brandishing weapons have
circulated in the news like wildfire. French and British newspapers attended to
the “exceptionality” of women’s participation in armed conflict, describing
Kurdish women fighters as “Joans of Arc” whose bravery “emasculates” the
3 Following the new Iraqi constitution, the region is officially referred to as the Iraqi Kurdistan Region
(IKR), but is more commonly known as KRI (Kurdistan Region of Iraq).
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Islamic State (Toivanen and Başer, 2016: 306-308). Even fashion magazines
Marie Claire and Elle featured profiles and images of these women, focusing on
the supposed contradiction between their femininity and their “incalculable”
courage (Griffin, 2014; Toranian, 2014); while clothing retailer H&M started
marketing khaki jumpsuits purportedly modelled on those worn by Kurdish
guerrilla fighters (Ismail, 2014). Although the images of these women tap into
the repertoires of representation deployed by Kurdish nationalists in Iraq and
elsewhere over the past century, they are simultaneously projections of EuroAmerican fantasy, serving political and ideological purposes in Europe and
North America that legitimise the war on terror.
Branding the nation, branding civilisation
The period that begins with the the US invasion of Iraq is a crucial period
for nationalisms and nation-states globally because of the emergent practice of
branding ethnicity, nation, and civilisation. Since that time as well, Kurdish
women have become doubly signified through nationalist as well as EuroAmerican anti-terror discourses. In Iraqi Kurdistan, as I describe below,
practices of nation-branding culminated early on in a public relations campaign
called “The Other Iraq”. Since then, the KRG has continued its lobbying
efforts in the United States through a handful of other neo-conservative
lobbying and public relations firms. From building the tourist economy and
fighting terrorism to inviting foreign investors, finance capital, and neoliberal
entrepreneurialism, Brand Kurdistan has been a way of proving to Western
audiences that the Kurds are a liberal exception in an illiberal Middle East, and
therefore, of building prospects for KRG’s eventual national independence as
a ready and willing ally of (and purveyor of oil to) American empire.
In Ethnicity, Inc., Jean and John Comaroff (2009) examine how cultural
identity in the present manifests simultaneously as an object of rational choice
and as the immanent essence of human being. The emergence of the ethnic-ascommodity, they suggest, is not merely an unfolding transformation of “the
ontology of ethnic consciousness”; perhaps more importantly, this emergence
reveals the intensification of market forces and the consequent shifts in the
form and meaning of capital (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2009: 20). Ethnicity is
branded not only as an outward expression of cultural heritage for the sake of
enticing tourist dollars, but also as a means of flattening out the realms of
difference and contestation that gave way to “heritage” in the first place.
Branding, for them, is a process of “creating an affective attachment to a named
product, to both its object-form and to the idea of an association with it” (2009:
18). Branding is thus not merely a means of incentivising consumers to buy into
reified cultural heritage; it is also a way of vesting producers of cultural heritage
in the singular idea of the ethnic-as-commodity.
Because of the increasing entanglements between neoliberal statecraft and
ethno-nationalism, the concept of Ethnicity, Inc. gives way to what the
Comaroffs (2009: 118) call “Nationality, Inc.,” a mode of political belonging
Copyright @ 2018 KURDISH STUDIES © Transnational Press London
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that has “[insinuated] itself into the heart of the liberal nation-state”. In fact,
they argue that this phenomenon is not anomalous, but is rather the logical
culmination of centuries of corporate mercantilism enabled by European
liberalism and expansionism, exemplified by the overdetermined place that the
British, French, and Dutch East India Companies occupied in each country’s
consolidations of empire. But where liberal orthodoxy saw the nation-state as
a natural articulation of population to polity and vice versa, nation and state are
now rearticulated through capital, such that the hyphen in nation-state acts as a
cipher for the forms of wealth, assets, and capital exchange that currently
determine the relationship between population and polity (2009: 127).
Nationality, Inc. thus injects the corporate back into the nation-state, making
corporatism the sole idiom for governance, order, citizenship, and social
organisation.
In her book Branding the Nation, Melissa Aronczyk (2013) expands upon the
Comaroffs’ concept of Nationality, Inc. According to Aronczyk, the concept
of nation branding is similar but not quite identical to the process of branding
and marketing any other product. While nation branding does involve
significant marketing and commodification of largely intangible goods like
cultural heritage, it also plays a role in reproducing the nation-state “as container
of distinct identities and loyalties, and as project for sovereignty and selfdetermination” (2013: 9). This is because making nation-brands recognisable
and giving them social life is, for branding and marketing professionals (as well
as for their clients, the governments of nation-states), about defining and
consolidating largely ambiguous concepts like community, authenticity, and
distinction. Nation-branding is a collaboration between political leaders,
lobbyists, public relations managers, and marketing directors in order to
produce a reified imaginary about the geopolitical, cultural, and affective
contours of the nation, contours that speak at once to investors, tourists, and
even the citizens of the nation in question. Similarly, nation branding forecloses
the possibility that populations could belong to anything except nation-states,
themselves made legible through these reified imaginaries.
While nation branding is a globalised and globalising process, the vast
majority of brand consultancies and marketing agencies behind these processes
are located in the United States and Britain. As a consequence, these brands are
inexorably haunted by orientalist and imperial structures of knowledge and
domination, structures that inevitably constrain the realm of the possible. As
Aronczyk writes, “the logics that underpin the practice [of nation branding]
maintain and reinforce historical inequalities and reify paternalist and
neocolonial assumptions” (2013: 13). Keeping in mind the aforementioned
histories of European corporate mercantilism, then, branded nations are the
consummation of the ongoing reification of the nation-state and the increasing
liquidity, financialisation, and abstraction of capital.
In the Middle East, nation branding has imbricated tried and true
Oriental(ist) tropes with images and discourses of urban, cosmopolitan
www.KurdishStudies.net
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modernity: tellingly, for example, the campaign to brand Egypt proposed to
show a flying carpet over the pyramids before having it appear above a cityscape
(Iğsız, 2014: 696). In the case of Turkey in the mid-to-late 2000s, the branding
process articulated the country as a bridge for an “alliance of civilisations” in
which Turkey would use its “knowledge…regarding the differences between
East and West,” along with its “traditional” relationships with other Middle
Eastern countries, to act as a model Muslim democracy for its embattled
neighbours. The plan that emerged out of this transnational effort at nation
branding was to “enhance the EU’s sphere of influence” across the Middle East
and to spread Western, humanist, cosmopolitan democracy by proxy (Iğsız,
2014: 697). In the purportedly civilisational crisis that has emerged in the Middle
East since September 11, then, branding the nation is not merely a modality of
“ethnicity, inc.” or “nationality, inc.” but also what Aslı Iğsız identifies as
“civilisation, inc.” (2014: 696).
To be sure, the concept of nation branding has been predominantly
theorised from the paradigm of already-existing nation-states. Yet as I hope to
show below, the Kurdistan Regional Government has seized upon the practice
of nation branding to shore up not only its political legitimacy but also its place
within the global capitalist market. Marketing Iraqi Kurdistan to Western
countries as a destination for investments that have significant financial as well
as moral returns is also a way of marketing the promise and the possibility of
Iraqi Kurdistan as a fellow nation-state in the world. Given the place of
Kurdistan in the discourses of the war on terror, its representation as the last
bastion of civilisation against the savagery of Islamic fundamentalism, this
civilisational component of branding the nation plays an especially key role in
Brand Kurdistan. The backdrop of the war on terror has endowed efforts to
brand the nation with a particularly moralising political urgency.
The public relations of Brand Kurdistan
The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has been represented in the
United States and internationally by at least half a dozen multinational public
relations, marketing, and lobbying firms since 2004. Here I will focus on three
of the more significant firms: Barbour Griffith & Rogers, Russo Marsh &
Rogers, and Dentons LLP. Since mid-2004, these firms have been working in
collaboration with seasoned politicians from Iraqi Kurdistan, such as
Nechirvan Barzani, Qubad Talabani, Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman, and Karim
Sinjari, in order to develop advertising campaigns, liaise with politicians,
establish business connections between the United States and Iraqi Kurdistan,
and contribute monies to American politicians and political groups across the
ideological spectrum at the federal, state, and local levels. In spite of the failure
of the independence referendum in September 2017, the Kurdistan Regional
Government is poised to spend millions of dollars on US lobbyists in 2018.
The KRG hired Barbour Griffith and Rogers, which also works under the
name BGR Government Affairs LLC, in June 2004 at a yearly cost of at least
Copyright @ 2018 KURDISH STUDIES © Transnational Press London
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$354,000. According to investigative reporting published in the American
magazine Mother Jones, the infamous American lobbyist Jack Abramoff had
initially been approached to represent the Iraqi Kurds before they ended up
working with BGR (Rozen, 2007). BGR was founded by two senior aides to
former President George H. W. Bush and, in November of 2004, George W.
Bush’s chief Iraq advisor also joined the firm. According to lobbying disclosure
records mandated by the United States Department of Justice, BGR was hired
with the mission to “develop a better understanding among U.S. officials of
foreign and domestic issues in occupied Iraq [and to] meet with U.S. officials
engaged on issues involving the reconstruction and post-reconstruction
Government of Iraq”.
On 23 June 2004, less than a month into the working relationship between
KRG and BGR, three U.S. military helicopters arrived in Erbil in Iraqi
Kurdistan, carrying fifteen tons’ worth of $100 bills, totalling $1.4 billion
(Paddock and Miller, 2005). This extraordinary cash hand-off was made by Paul
Bremer, the outgoing leader of the U.S.-run Coalition Provisional Authority.
The money had ostensibly been paid to Saddam Hussein through the U.N.’s
controversial oil-for-food program but had been withheld from the Kurdistan
region for several years. Though it remains unclear what exactly compelled
Bremer to make such a spectacular transfer of cash,4 the task of finding a bank
willing to accept fifteen tons of cash fell to BGR. The KRG renewed their
contract with BGR at nearly double the price: $700,000 annually as of 2007, the
last publicly disclosed contract between the two parties. BGR remains on
retainer for the KRG and continues to actively correspond with members of
the US Congress on “U.S.-Kurdistan relations”: in the six-month period
between June and December 2015, for example, BGR made over 2,300
telephone conversations and email exchanges with members of Congress on
the topic.
In 2005, the year that the Barzani-led KDP and the Talabani-led PUK
merged administrations, the Kurdistan Regional Government hired another
US-based public relations and lobbying firm, Russo Marsh and Rogers (RM&R)
to “promote its interests” (Berkowitz, 2005). RM&R is a California-based firm
long affiliated with Republican Party politicians and electoral campaigns. In
addition to sponsoring a “Move America Forward” tour intended to shore up
support for the Iraq War, RM&R also led a smear campaign against Barbara
Lee, the only member of Congress who voted against the authorisation of the
use of force after 9/11 (Berkowitz, 2005).

4 In her investigation into the event, journalist Laura Rozen encountered an Israeli-American
businessman and former counterterrorism commando named Shlomi Michaels who claimed to have pulled
the strings that led to the cash transfer. Her reporting further suggests that Michaels and other well-connected
Israeli intelligence operatives played a role in facilitating the Kurds’ relationships with lobbyists like BGR.
For more, see Rozen, L. (April 11th, 2007). Kurdistan's Covert Back-Channels. Mother Jones. Retrieved at
www.motherjones.com/politics/2007/04/kurdistans-covert-back-channels/ (last accessed 28 October
2017).
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While RM&R, a pro-Iraq War, pro-US imperial firm, might seem like a
puzzling choice to represent the KRG, it is instructive to look at the rhetoric of
the PR campaign that they led to understand the potential appeal of Brand
Kurdistan to neoconservative projects of American war-making. RM&R
pioneered “The Other Iraq” campaign, which aired radio and television
commercials in the United States and the United Kingdom (the two largest
contributors of troops to the coalition forces in Iraq). One television
commercial from 2006, titled “Thank you,” begins with a shot of a graveyard.
The narrator says, “Saddam’s goal was to bury every living Kurd… He failed.”
The rest of the commercial features smiling “Kurd Citizens” (as named in the
script) all looking into the camera and saying variations of “Thank you,”
“Thank you America/Great Britain,” “Thank you for democracy”. The
narrator intervenes, “The Kurds of Iraqi Kurdistan just want to say ‘thank
you’… for helping us win our freedom”. It ends with a Kurdish child waving
an American flag while a “Kurdish Hero Girl” (also as named in the script),
offers one last declaration of thanks (Kurdistan: The Other Iraq [A], 2006). This
ad spot casts the United States and Great Britain, not as capitalist empires
fighting wars for oil, but as benevolent protectors of the downtrodden, as
purveyors of democracy, human rights, and freedom. The discourse of the
campaign, in other words, maps perfectly onto the discourses used by the likes
of George W. Bush and Dick Cheney in justifying the war: that it was a war
against evil, a war to protect “American values” abroad. Just as the US war in
Afghanistan was couched in the language of liberating women from the tyranny
of a perverse Islamic patriarchy (Abu-Lughod, 2002), the invasion of Iraq is
cast here as a fundamentally good and just war to liberate the Kurds from the
tyranny of Saddam Hussein.
Another 2006 spot by RM&R, titled “Open for business,” imbricates
discourses of entrepreneurship, innovation, and investment with nebulous
discourses of hope and democracy:
VOICEOVER NARRATOR:
In the Kurdistan region of Iraq investors aren’t just building an airport…
AIRPORT MANAGER:
We are building a democracy.
V/O NARRATOR:
They’re not just installing hospital labs…
LAB TECHNICIAN:
We are building hope.
V/O NARRATOR:
They’re not just planting a forest…
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REFORESTATION WORKER:
We are planting a future.
V/O NARRATOR:
Come see what’s happening in the “other” Iraq…Iraqi Kurdistan. See
the promise.
KURDISH HERO GIRL:
Share the dream. (Kurdistan: The Other Iraq [B], 2006)
Infrastructures of modernity like airports and hospitals serve in this spot as
indices of democracy and hope, suggesting that there is something ineffably
progressive and entrepreneurial about Kurdistan and about the Kurds
themselves. Ostensibly intended to invite foreign investment in capacity
building, infrastructure, medicine, technology, and other infrastructures, this
advertisement insinuates that such investments are inevitably investments in
democracy in the Middle East, investments in hope in times of war. The dream
of the “other Iraq,” its promise, is thus about being “open for business,” about
“planting a future” built on foreign investment.
It is telling that both advertisements described here feature a “Kurdish hero
girl,” because as I suggested above, women and their bodies are often mobilised
as metonyms of the Kurdish nation. By positing Kurdistan as a space where
women and girls are not only liberated and secular but are also doctors, workers,
and “heroes,” this PR campaign engages in the kind of institutionalised liberal
feminism that animates Euro-American political discourse. Investment, then, is
not only framed as entrenching democracy, but also as a way of empowering
women against the violent masculinities and oppression of women rampant in
the region (Abu-Lughod, 2002).
Joe Wierzbicki, the RM&R account executive in charge of the “Other Iraq”
campaign, argued that the KRG is a worthwhile partner of the United States
because, “of all the different groups in Iraq that have a vision for the future,
the vision of the Kurds is closest to ours. It’s important to recognise that the
Kurds are not hostile to the West” (Berkowitz, 2005). The key to this PR
campaign, then, is proving the exceptionality of the Kurds in a region of
barbarism, religious extremism, and anti-Americanism.
In addition to BGR and RM&R, the KRG has also worked with a firm called
Dentons US, LLP since 2015. KRG has between three and five Dentons
lobbyists on monthly retainer for yearly salaries of $240,000 apiece. In addition
to providing “advice to the foreign principal [KRG] in relation to the US
Government’s policies on Iraq and the Middle East”, Dentons and its lobbyists
have been making bipartisan campaign contributions to individual politicians,
political parties, and political action committees (PACs). In the latter half of the
2015 fiscal year, for example, Dentons made campaign contributions on behalf
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of the KRG totalling over $106,000 at the national level and just under $22,000
at the state and local level. Since that time and especially during the months
leading up to the 2016 election, those numbers have only swelled, such that the
state/local campaign contributions on behalf of the KRG were nearly $200,000.
Dentons also drafted letters that KRG sent to US Senators Dianne Feinstein
and Ben Cardin in March 2016, calling on them to help subsidise the peshmerga
monthly budget of $364.5 million, to the amount of over $197 million, due to
the urgency of their fight against ISIS.
These lobbying efforts have had enormous payoffs. The month after
Denton sent these letters to Feinstein and Cardin on the KRG’s behalf, the US
Department of Defense announced a reapportionment of military aid monies
to Iraq, allocating $415 million for ammunition, food, medical aid, and salaries
for the peshmerga. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2016 earmarked $715 million for the peshmerga, while in 2017 it offered them
$630 million. In 2018, this amount was more than doubled to just shy of $1.27
billion.
The ideological agendas of these neoconservative lobbying and PR firms
have been built into the construction and circulation of Brand Kurdistan, and
they animate its political, cultural, and economic priorities. Because Iraqi
Kurdistan is being packaged and sold in Europe and North America within the
discourse of the ongoing war on terror, its uncertain political future has become
inexorably hitched to the fate of US empire in the region. Brand Kurdistan is
thus a paradigmatic example of “civilisation, inc.”: a discretely marketable asset
of liberal modernity amid the troubles that are understood as pathological in
the Middle East.
“Songs as strong as weapons”: Kurdish nation-building and the politics
of pop music
The political and economic work of branding Kurdistan represents a useful
backdrop against which to situate Helly Luv, an Iraqi Kurdish musician who
grew up in the diaspora but has made her career as a pop musician through her
return to Iraqi Kurdistan. Helly Luv was born in Iran in 1988 to parents fleeing
Saddam Hussein’s Anfal campaign. According to Luv, her mother was a
member of the peshmerga. After growing up in Finland, Helly Luv moved to
the United States to pursue a career in music. Since signing to an independent
label in 2011, she has released three songs: “Risk It All”, “Revolution”, and
“Finally”, all of which are avowedly political projects that thematise Kurdish
liberation.
Before proceeding, I would like to emphasise the extraordinary amount of
music that has been produced in Kurdistan and the Kurdish diaspora in
response to the war since the inception of ISIS. Music has long been a critical
feature of Kurdish resistance transnationally, and even within the field of
Kurdish musical production, arguments over aesthetics and genre are at once
arguments over political priorities and commitments (Aksoy, 2013; Hammo,
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2017). Some Kurdish musicians in diaspora have called for a return to Kurdish
music’s traditional roots, lambasting the turn to popular music by musicians like
Helly Luv and Dashni Morad, another Kurdish diasporic diva who sings
political pop primarily in English (Sulaivany, 2017). In March of 2016, a group
of Kurdish women in Germany initiated a solidarity campaign called
female:pressure to crowdsource electronic music from which any profits made
would be donated to women’s organisations in Rojava (female:pressure, 2016).
By focusing solely on Helly Luv, I do not intend to flatten the complex and
contested terrain of contemporary Kurdish music production. Rather, I am
interested in highlighting the ways in which Luv’s music is a culmination of
both Kurdish nationalist discourse about women and the practice of nation
branding in Iraqi Kurdistan. In other words, her music and her persona are
paradigmatic manifestations of the repertoires of Brand Kurdistan: she is an
iconic, strong, secular woman who performs and embodies the liberal, secular,
democratic orthodoxies that undergird normative life within the nation-state.
Helly Luv and her music are very much the product not only of the
transnational flows of pop music as a genre, but also of her diasporic
background. In an interview with NBC News, for example, she declares that “I
don’t think I could have [made this kind of music] if I’d grown up in Kurdistan”
(Moussavi, 2014). As Jane Sugarman (2010) has written in the case of Kosovo,
music and cultural production in diaspora shape the political and cultural worlds
within the so-called homeland, especially in contexts of war. For example,
singers from Albania who recorded songs of solidarity with Kosovans afflicted
by the Yugoslav war were often seen by music industry professionals in Kosovo
as “capitalising on the suffering of [Kosovans]” (Sugarman, 2010: 32). Perhaps
more importantly, however, music made by Albanians had the effect of
imposing a mythic understanding of the war, shaping the war’s place in the
historical consciousness of Albanians and naturalising the war “as a necessity
and an inevitability” (2010: 38). As such, diasporic music must be understood
as “a site of negotiation, and at times contestation… [that forges] a sense of
national purpose by eliding or mystifying social difference” (2010: 18). Music
made by diasporic musicians impinges powerfully upon political terrains in the
homeland, renegotiating and rearticulating priorities, horizons, and futures.
Through its repertoires of image and discourse, Helly Luv’s music “[plays] on
the emotions” embedded in the concept of the homeland itself (2010: 37). Like
the “Kurdish Hero Girl” who figured into the campaign to brand the Iraqi
Kurdistan Region as “the other Iraq,” Helly Luv and her music map onto the
logics of imperial feminism that have underpinned and justified exercises of US
interventionism in the Middle East (Abu-Lughod, 2002).
Helly Luv’s song “Risk It All” came out with an accompanying video in
2013. While the lyrics speak to a vague sense of political disquiet, the video
features an array of striking imagery that speaks to the overdetermined tropes
through which Euro-American media have represented Kurdish women in the
context of war (Toivanen and Başer, 2016). Throughout the video, as with
www.KurdishStudies.net

Glastonbury 125

“Revolution”, she is adorned in gold bangles, rings, and bracelets, and her hands
are covered in henna. The video begins with Luv lighting a Molotov cocktail
and throwing it down an alley, where it explodes into flames along the ground
and up the walls. The scene highlights the contradictions between her
appearance as a wealthy, fashionable, beautiful, feminine woman and her
commitments to an emancipatory political project, the Molotov cocktail a stark
counterpoint to her jewels and makeup. The rest of the video articulates these
contradictions sartorially, capitalising on Orientalist fantasies about women’s
bodies beneath the veil and toggling between traditional Kurdish attire and
risqué “modern” dress.
As the song breaks into its first chorus, Helly Luv appears on a rooftop,
singing the chorus and wearing a dress made of hundreds of very small mirrors.
The dress and its many mirrors, refracting and glinting in the sunset, are
emblematic of what Kurdistan becomes in the narrative of her song and of
Brand Kurdistan writ large, a projection of Western liberal fantasy, a reflection
of what Western audiences might indeed expect out of Brand Kurdistan: the
liberated, Orientalised woman; the urban sprawl, with its scattered skyscrapers
and buildings, reflected in her dress; an entire landscape refracting off her body;
the inchoate, urbane nation-state that is coming to pass spreading behind her,
as she sings “I don’t wanna wait no more.”
The bridge, a repeated refrain of “Put your guns up in the air,” features Helly
Luv standing in a khaki jumpsuit surrounded by women holding M-16s and
wearing keffiyehs. Thereafter, she appears sitting in a golden throne in the desert,
flanked by two female lions. She is covered in jewellery, including a bejewelled
ornamental bindi on her forehead. The rampant self-Orientalising iconography
of the video, subtended by a mélange of exotic pop beats, are at odds with the
particularity of the political project Luv intended in the video.
Describing “Risk It All” in an interview, Helly Luv said: “I wanted to create
a song that would represent and celebrate the freedom of the Kurds because,
as you know, we Kurds have a long, horrible, bloody history. ‘Risk It All’ is a
celebration of that, risking everything for a dream, and the dream for Kurds is
obviously independence” (Al-Nasrawi, 2015). Elsewhere, she argues that “we
all as Kurds have one dream, and that is independence” (Crowcroft, 2014). The
song heralds the possibility of a unified nation-state for Kurdistan, a possibility
represented as a tremendous yet urgent risk, indeed, a life or death decision.
This same heightened sense of risk is at play in her song “Revolution.” As I
mention in the beginning of this article, “Revolution” stages an encounter
between ISIS and a Kurdish village. As soon as ISIS starts shelling the village,
Helly Luv appears with a banner that reads “STOP THE VIOLENCE” and
brandishes it in front of the tank. The rest of the video is a montage that shifts
between the villagers staging an insurrection against the invading forces and
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peshmerga making advances on a battlefield, shooting at enemies with AK-47s,
missiles, and tanks.5
About halfway through the song, the music slows to a stop; the only sound
is the sound of many people marching in unison. The shot turns to a large
platoon of soldiers dressed in blue, ceremonial attire, wearing white gloves, blue
hats, and black aviator sunglasses, carrying M-16s over their left shoulder. Helly
Luv sings “We’re marching” a few times over the sound of them stepping in
unison. She appears at the front of the platoon, wearing a blue jacket with red
accents and gold trim; red pants; a red, blue, and gold hat with the flag of
Kurdistan on the front; gold cords and aiguillettes; red-yellow aviator glasses; a
gold M-16 (that, in other scenes, is replaced with a gold sabre). This is what
Helly Luv’s “Revolution” really heralds: rather than a transformation of social
relations and the very terms through which a state apparatus monopolises
violence, “Revolution” offers a modernised, Westernised, well-disciplined
military apparatus marching on an airstrip and led by a woman. The video
borrows the iconography of guerrilla insurgent movements in which women
feature prominently, from the People’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel,
YPG) and the Women’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Jin, YPJ) in Rojava
to the People’s Defence Forces (Hêzên Parastina Gel, HPG) and Union of Free
Women (Yekîtiya Jinên Azad, YJA) in Turkey. This iconography is deployed here
in the service of an intransigently patriarchal and ethnonationalist military force,
the peshmerga. The slogan of “STOP THE VIOLENCE” emblazoned on
Helly Luv’s banner at the beginning of the music video is transfigured here into
a spectacular re-monopolisation of violence by a state-supported, regimented,
Westernised military.
Immediately after this sequence, Helly Luv appears atop a tank in her
guerrilla outfit, surrounded by a crowd of villagers, all of whom brandish the
flags of different countries, from Turkey and Iraq to the United States, Canada,
the United Kingdom, and Australia; from Israel and Palestine to Qatar and
Kurdistan. Whether such flags call to mind imperial or neocolonial powers that
have been responsible for fomenting instability, sectarianism, fundamentalism,
and mass violence in the greater Kurdistan region is inconsequential: the flags
signify the promise of peaceable cooperation among nation-states, and they
index the principles of a nation-state order enshrined by the United Nations.
The conglomeration of flags in the space of Kurdistan’s battlefield amounts to
a performance of the potential that international solidarity with the Kurds
might have for the successes of the war against ISIS and the larger war on terror.
Coupled with the villagers’ banners of “peace”, “freedom” and “no more
5 The specificity of this scene, of Kurdish peshmerga defending a village, has its own representational
politics. At the height of the ISIS siege on the predominantly Yezidi region of Sinjar in the Iraqi Kurdistan
Region in August 2014, the Yezidis were abandoned by the peshmerga forces who were supposed to be
responsible for defending them, resulting in the starvation, sexual enslavement, and massacre of thousands
of Yezidis. This event highlights the tensions within the discourse of Peshmerga-as-liberator, demonstrating
the need for more sobering accounts of the ethnonationalist and religious pitfalls in the Brand Kurdistan
project. For more, see Buffon and Allison (2016).
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genocide” earlier in the video, the flags (in the hands of the Kurdish villagers)
perform a renewed commitment to liberal humanism and the nation-state
system that exists to protect the sanctity of the liberal humanist order.
Helly Luv has been received by audiences in complicated ways. Kurdish
media outlets like Rudaw have had mixed reactions to Helly Luv's music, with
one interviewer commenting on her “bad clothes” and questioning her decision
to sing in English instead of Kurdish. However, she has been taken up
uncritically in Western media across the political spectrum, precisely because
her music taps into and mobilises discourses about the war on terror. “Meet the
Kurdish pop star fighting ISIS with songs”, exclaims an NBC news headline,
while NPR proclaims her a “Kurdish warrior-diva [who] sings against ISIS,
despite threats”. Vice similarly describes her as “a Kurdish Shakira with the
political temperament of M.I.A. [... a] pop culture ambassador for Kurdistan
and the peshmerga fighters”. Radio Free Europe (2014) heralds Helly Luv as a
“siren for Kurdish independence”. In addition to her reception in the
aforementioned liberal Western media, she has also been interviewed multiple
times on right-wing channels like Fox News as well as the pro-Israeli channel
i24News: the same channels that promote US empire in the Middle East, that
advocate settler colonialism and dispossession, find in the figure of Helly Luv
an admirable political project. These journalists and commentators describe her
as “fighting with her voice… [issuing a] call to action against Islamic state” in
support of a “secular message of Kurdish independence”. One Fox News
contributor described the video as a “culture war” against ISIS, lauding Luv for
producing music “as strong as their weapons”. Proceeding from a belief in the
inherent auspiciousness of music, these commentators impose a narrative
frame upon and around the scene of Kurdish politics, a narrative frame rooted
in the same rhetoric that animate Brand Kurdistan.
Although Helly Luv’s music traffics in the iconography and the urgency of
revolution, “Risk It All” and “Revolution” proceed from a liberal belief in the
normative value of music as a tool for communicating across difference, for
building multicultural humanist democracy, and for advancing the “dream” of
the Kurds. These songs tap into the ethos of revolution in the service of Iraqi
Kurdistan’s legitimacy on a world stage, and in so doing, they impose an ethicopolitical horizon that collapses the differences in political priority between
competing ideologies of Kurdish liberation. Like Brand Kurdistan,
“Revolution” builds upon the array of Kurdish futures unfolding in the region,
drawing upon their zeal and their jouissance, packaging them into a discrete and
marketable asset, in order to ultimately foreclose those futures.
While Helly Luv and her music transmit an affect of revolution, at every
moment they index some of the most intransigent fixtures of the hegemonic
global order: from capitalist consumer cultures and liberal discourses of
feminism and tolerance to “the rooting of peoples and the territorialization of
national identity” (Malkki, 1992). What these songs offer, and indeed, what
Brand Kurdistan offers, is a Manichaean choice between what the Kurds
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represent and what the Islamic State represents, between freedom and terror,
between good and evil. This choice is the same choice posed in the binary world
discourse of the war on terror and the clash of civilisations, a discourse aligned
with neoconservative American war-making and exertions of US empire.
Predicated on this binary world discourse, Brand Kurdistan was supposed to
guarantee the prospective formation of an Iraqi Kurdish nation-state and the
retrenchment of US foreign policy in the Middle East. Brand Kurdistan was
thus poised “to change everything in order that nothing change” (Wallerstein,
1995: 218). Then the referendum happened.
“Finally”: Brand Kurdistan after the referendum
This article has attempted to unpack the kinds of horizons that come to bear
upon the discourses and narratives of Kurdish liberation in Brand Kurdistan
and in the music of Helly Luv. Up until very recently, these horizons seemed
to suggest that the KRG, under the aegis of Masoud Barzani, was poised to
enter into the international community with gusto, a secular, progressive,
entrepreneurial, resource-rich nation-state in an embattled region, a polity that
renewed and extended the auspices of neoliberalism. To achieve these goals,
the KRG waged a massive lobbying effort in Washington D.C. and abroad over
the past thirteen years. In this campaign to brand and package the Kurdish
nation, the KRG’s political and economic futurity “depended on turning
finance capital into cultural capital and vice versa” (Comaroff and Comaroff,
2009: 8). To this end, the KRG worked to convince investors and politicians
alike that, whether in terms of military aid, finance, infrastructure, or
technology, they could buy into the right side of history by supporting Iraqi
Kurdistan and the cause of Kurdish independence.
In the lead-up to the independence referendum on 25 September 2017,
Helly Luv released a song called “Finally”, meant to herald the long-awaited
prospect of Kurdish independence “after all the generations of war and blood.”
She performed the song for a packed stadium at a pro-independence rally in
Erbil. The song, with its repeated refrain “finally we here [sic],” suggests, in
keeping with the promise of the nation-state, that Kurdistan has arrived at the
mythic end of history, a history saturated with “generations of war and blood”
that could only be resolved with the formation of a Kurdish state. And indeed,
in the first few days after the referendum, which was approved with over 90%
of the vote, this seemed to have come true. Kurds living in other parts of
Kurdistan as well as in the diaspora were elated, not least of all for the possibility
that it might augur greater autonomy in these other parts of Kurdistan.
However, the success of the referendum plunged the central Iraqi
government into crisis, in large part because it depends upon the oil reserves
and fertile farmland in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Iraqi government responded by
coordinating military exercises with Iran along the border between Iran and the
Iraqi Kurdistan Region to emphasise “the territorial integrity and unity of Iraq
and the illegitimacy of the independence referendum in northern Iraq” and to
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discourage the KRG from following through with secession and independence
(Al-Jazeera, 2017). The central Iraqi government also banned international
flights into Iraqi Kurdistan’s airports. In October 2017, Iraqi military forces
entered Kirkuk to reclaim control over the region, and after five days of
skirmishes with the peshmerga, the conflict came to an end with Iraq once again
in control. In the aftermath of this battle, KRG President Masoud Barzani
resigned. From November 2017 until March 2018, the KRG was under
embargo, until finally, in the lead up to the 2018 Newroz (Kurdish New Year)
festival, the central Iraqi government formally brought the KRG back into the
fold, lifting the flight ban and introducing new economic agreements with the
KRG (Coker, 2018).
Given that the political, economic, and discursive machinery of Brand
Kurdistan has been working for the past fifteen years to make an Iraqi Kurdish
nation-state eminently more possible, as I have argued in this article, how could
the referendum have failed so spectacularly? How could these efforts at
consolidating the Kurdish nation have resulted in “a dimmer, more internally
divided, regionally and internationally isolated political entity”?6
The failure of Brand Kurdistan to deliver on its internal promise reveals an
array of contradictions at the heart of American empire. As an attempt to bridge
the priorities of Iraqi Kurdish political figures with those of North American
and Western European political figures, Brand Kurdistan coalesced in the joint
ideological project of national self-determination, a liberal discourse that has
subtended the work of American imperialism since the end of World War I.
This American commitment to self-determination is tempered by its
involvement in NATO, as a consequence of which the United States is an ally
of countries like Turkey, which threatened military action if the KRG had
followed through with the referendum.
Furthermore, the project of American empire is also one that prioritises
resource extraction and capital accumulation in a global free market in which
the United States reigns sovereign. The embargoes that the central Iraqi
government imposed in the wake of the referendum, along with its longstanding insistence on control over the sale of oil from Iraqi Kurdish oil fields
(and its concomitant refusal to let the KRG enter into contracts with oil
companies), turned into obstacles to these latter priorities, which ultimately
threatened the liquidity of oil flows to the United States. Each of these faces of
American empire is at odds with the others, belying its fickle, craven exercises
in hegemony across the Middle East. No matter how the cards may have fallen
after the referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan, the concatenated workings of empire
would have ensured that the United States would emerge as the winner.
While Brand Kurdistan may have been subject to the vicissitudes of
American empire, it is a project that fails on its own terms as well. The
commodification of identity is a process that depends upon the “recognition of
6 I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for this formulation and for drawing my attention to this
particular quandary.
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irreducible difference” within the political space of the nation, upon the fixing
of a discrete and unified identity that cuts across domains of culture, ideology,
and class (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2009: 123). Iraqi Kurdistan, however, is
marked instead by an irreducible diversity, populated as it is by multiple dialects
of the Kurdish language and multiple religious denominations, to say nothing
of the manifold histories of struggle over political and economic ideologies.
There is no singular Kurdistan, no singular Kurdishness, that can be made easily
legible to people living within Iraqi Kurdistan region or to people around the
globe. Indeed, this is why the promise of the nation-state is so vexing and
mercurial in the Kurdish context: at every moment, the complex and varied
social and political worlds alive in Kurdistan today are always pressing against
and exceeding the narrative frame that the nation-state offers. Consequently,
the failure of the KRG to achieve “independence”—in spite of its fifteen-year
branding campaign, in spite of Helly Luv’s ethos of revolution— should be
regarded as an invitation to reappraise the false promise and the cruel optimism
of the nation-state, as an injunction to imagine and usher in different, more just
political and economic futures.
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